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Abstract—The Maker Protocol (“Maker”) is a decentral-
ized finance application that enables collateralized lending.
The application uses open-bid, second-price auctions to com-
plete its loan liquidation process. In this paper, we develop
a bidding function for these auctions, focusing on the costs
incurred to participate in the auctions. We then optimize
these costs using parameters from historical auction data,
and compare our optimal bidding prices to the historical
auction prices. We find that the majority of auctions end at
higher prices than our recommended optimal prices, and we
propose several theories for these results.
I. Introduction
Auctions have been used in numerous ways, in both
online and offline contexts. A little-studied area has
been the use of auctions on public blockchains, and
particularly auctions used in the context of decentralized
finance (“DeFi”) applications on Ethereum. Because all
transactions on the Ethereum blockchain are public,
auctions conducted by DeFi applications can be studied
in a great level of detail.
This paper examines the auctions of one particular
DeFi application, the Maker Protocol (“Maker”). This
paper contains the following insights.
1) Auction overview: We describe the process by
which Maker auctions are executed, as well as the
characteristics of the auctions within the framework
of formal auction theory.
2) Optimal bidding strategy: We outline a conceptual
model to understand bidder valuations. We then
apply the conceptual model to arrive at a proposed
bidding strategy, which focuses on optimizing par-
ticipation costs.
3) Historical comparison: We solve for the optimiza-
tion of participation costs, based on parameters
from historical auctions, and use these participation
costs to recommend optimal bidding prices. We then
compare our recommended bidding prices to actual
auction prices, and propose reasons for differences
between the proposed strategy and historical results.
The paper is organized in the following manner: Sec-
tions II and III provide context on DeFi and the Maker
Protocol, respectively. Section IV proposes a conceptual
model to understand Maker auctions, and then proposes
an optimal bidding strategy. Section V then defines
the costs to participate in Maker auctions. Section VI
The authors thank Florian Ederer for his helpful comments. All
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describes the process for optimizing participation costs,
and then compares the optimized participation costs to
historical auctions on the blockchain. Section VII pro-
vides concluding remarks. Appendix A defines Maker
auctions within the framework of formal auction theory.
II. Decentralized finance
Ethereum, first launched in 2015, is a blockchain net-
work powered by a Proof-of-Work algorithm, with Ether
(“ETH”) as its currency. The network’s defining feature
is its ability to execute smart contracts on the Ethereum
Virtual Machine [1]. The network has attracted a range of
potential use-cases, with varying degrees of feasibility.
One of Ethereum’s most visible use-cases has been
the enablement of DeFi applications. These applica-
tions use Ethereum smart contracts to enable financial
transactions, ranging from the relatively simple (lending
and borrowing) to the more complex (synthetic asset
trading and liquidity pooling) [2]. The transactions are
commonly performed with stablecoins, which are cryp-
tocurrencies with values intended to be pegged to the
US dollar at a 1:1 ratio. Stablecoins are often hosted
by the same DeFi applications that enable lending and
borrowing [3].
A common metric for DeFi usage is Total Value Locked
(“TVL”), which measures the amount of currency held in
smart contracts used to conduct DeFi transactions. As of
December 31, 2018, TVL was measured at $275M; by July
31, 2020, TVL was measured at $4.0B [4]. While TVL has
several limitations in capturing the true value of DeFi
applications [5], [6], its increase implies a general rise in
DeFi usage since the beginning of 2019.
Formal research on DeFi applications is relatively
scarce, as DeFi is a nascent technology in the only
recently-established field of cryptocurrency technology.
Relevant research includes i) overviews of DeFi from
an economic and legal perspective [7], [8]; ii) analyses
of actual or potential exploits for DeFi applications [9],
[10]; and iii) definitions of mathematical characteristics
for DeFi applications [11], [12].
III. Maker Protocol
A. Overview
The Maker Protocol, which was created in 2014 [13],
is a DeFi application whose primary purpose is to facil-
itate the creation of the DAI stablecoin. Users can send
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cryptocurrency (for example, ETH1) to a Maker smart
contract, which is referred to as the user’s “vault.” The
cryptocurrency deposited in the vault can be used to
create DAI, which is recorded as a debt to the user. While
the debt remains outstanding, the original currency in
the vault is “locked” and serves as collateral for the
outstanding debt. Maker requires users to maintain a
minimum “collateral ratio”, which is the ratio between
the value of locked collateral and the debt. If the collat-
eral ratio falls below a certain threshold,2 the user’s vault
is liquidated [15].
Similar to research on the overall DeFi industry, formal
research on Maker is relatively meager. Three relevant
papers, all published in the past year, have focused on
disparate topics concerning the project: potential exploits
of Maker’s governance voting process [9], historical fail-
ures in Maker’s pricing oracles [16], and a proposed
model to evaluate default risk in Maker’s loan portfolio
[17].
B. Auction process
In Maker’s liquidation process, the user’s collateral
(“lot”) is put up for auction.3 The target proceeds (“tab”)
include the value of the vault’s debt, plus a liquidation
penalty.4 All bids are submitted in DAI [18], and the
bidders participating in the process are referred to as
“keepers” [19].
The auction is completed in two parts. First, in the
“tend” phase, the payment amount increases until the
target proceeds are met. Second, in the “dent” phase,
the reward received (the lot) decreases, until the auction
reaches the maximum auction duration,5 or until no
bidder is willing to bid lower than the current bid [18].
Regardless of the auction phase, the progress of the
auction can be measured through the auction price of
the collateral, relative to the current market value of the
collateral.
The auction reward must be unlocked by submitting
a “deal” transaction. If the auction reward is less than
the collateral originally offered in the auction (as a result
of decreasing bids in the dent phase), the difference is
returned to the user owning the liquidated vault [18].
The results of a recent auction, completed in June 2020,
are shown in Figure 1.
1The most common collateral used in the Maker Protocol is ETH,
or more precisely the ERC-20 compliant version called wrapped ETH
(WETH). For simplicity, we hereafter assume that WETH is the collat-
eral being used in the Maker application.
2As of this writing, the collateral ratio is set at 150% [14].
3This type of auction, referred to as a “collateral” auction in the
Maker process, is the focus of our analysis. The Maker process also
employs “surplus” and “debt” auctions [15]. These auction types occur
only rarely, and are out of scope for this paper.
4As of this writing, the liquidation penalty is set at 13% [14].
5As of this writing, the maximum auction duration is set at 6 hours
[20].
Fig. 1. Example auction results
The first liquidations to use this auction process were
completed in November 2019.6 Through July 31, 2020,
approximately $20.7M in collateral has been liquidated
in this auction process [22].
The most notable event in Maker’s auction process
occurred on March 12, 2020, when the price of ETH
dropped in excess of 40%. The rapid drop led to many
vaults being liquidated after falling below the 150%
collateral ratio [23]. In total, almost 4,000 liquidations
auctions were triggered on March 12, with a total value
of approximately $10.2M [22].
Because of the high gas fees on the Ethereum net-
work, many keepers were unable to submit bids on
the auctions. Without a robust network of bidders, the
handful of remaining bidders were able to submit zero-
value bids. As a result, multiple vaults were liquidated
at prices of zero, and the vaults’ users did not receive
any excess collateral [23].
Further explanation of the auction process, in the
context of formal auction theory, is given in Appendix
A.
IV. Bidding strategy
A. Conceptual example
In order to define the bidding strategy for Maker
auctions, we start with a conceptual example: bidding
for a jar filled with q quarters. The quarters have, in
total, a single market value, which can be expressed in
dollars as 0.25q. The seller does not hide the amount of
q; all bidders know the exact number of q, and therefore
the total value of the jar of coins. If no other factors were
present, it may be predicted that all bidders would bid
exactly 0.25q, because each bidder has exactly the same
valuation.
However, we must consider two other components to
the bidder valuations.
1) Alternative-usage value: While quarters are valued
at $0.25 cents by all bidders, the coins could be worth
more to certain individuals who could make additional
profit with the coins. For example, the coins could be
melted down and the raw materials used to produce
6Prior to November 2019, Maker used a fixed-discount collateral sale
to complete liquidations [21]; these sales are not considered in this
paper, as they did not utilize an auction process.
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another item that would be worth more than 0.25q. The
alternative-usage value of the coins, in excess of 0.25q,
is defined as a for an individual bidder. In all future
references, a refers to the excess of the alternative-usage
value over the market value, and not the alternative-
usage value itself.
2) Participation costs:
• Transaction costs: In this scenario, bidders must
pay a small fee to submit their bid, and another
small fee to collect the jar if their bid wins. The
total of these fees is defined as b.
• Conversion costs: Bidders pay for the jar of coins
in cash, but they can carry only a limited amount
of cash in their wallet. If several auctions took
place at the same time, a bidder who won an
auction would likely not have enough cash to
participate in a second auction. In order to have
enough cash on hand, a bidder would need to
periodically visit a bank and exchange their coins
for additional cash. The expense of visiting the
bank (the cost of transportation, the value of lost
time, etc.) are defined as c.
• Cost of capital: If bidders increased the amount
of cash held in their wallets, they would be able to
avoid visiting the bank as frequently as when they
held smaller amounts of cash. However, holding
cash in a wallet prevents bidders from earning
interest on cash deposited at the bank. The interest
foregone when withdrawing cash from the bank
is the cost of capital, defined as d.
Taking those private value considerations into effect,
the expected bid price for an individual bidder can be
defined as
0.25q + a − (b + c + d) (1)
In theory, the bidder with the highest value of a−(b+
c + d) would be able to bid the highest price for the jar
of coins.
B. Application to Maker auctions
In Maker auctions, the “jar of coins” is the collateral
being auctioned. The collateral has a clearly-defined
market value, and the value is known by all bidders
before the auction commences.
The additional components of the bidder valuations
are as follows:
1) Alternative-usage value: Bidders can sell their collat-
eral on the market, but they can also use the collateral
to gain additional profits elsewhere on the blockchain.
In theory, bidders could gain more profit by using the
collateral than they could holding DAI or US dollars.
2) Participation costs:
• Transaction fees: In order to submit a bid (tend
or dent), collect winnings (deal), or execute any
other transaction, bidders must pay a fee, known
as “gas fees” on the Ethereum blockchain.
• Conversion costs: Bidders must convert the collat-
eral they have won back into DAI, in order to con-
tinue participating in auctions. Because bidders
bid in DAI and receive back collateral of a different
currency, winning bidders will quickly run out
of DAI. When converting collateral back to DAI,
bidders must account for a loss in value when
executing a trade on a decentralized exchange.
This loss is referred to as “slippage.”
• Cost of capital: Bidders must invest some amount
of capital in holding DAI; the expected return on
their investment is their cost of capital.
Applying Equation (1), the expected auction winner
would be the bidder with the highest a − (b + c + d),
where a is the alternative-usage value of the collateral,
and b + c + d are the participation costs.
Using this model, we would expect the following
conditions to be true. If participation costs are higher
than alternative-usage value, then the winning auction
price would be below the market price. If the alternative-
usage value and the participation costs are equal, the
winning auction price would be at the market price. If
the alternative-usage value is higher than participation
costs, the winning auction price would not (as might
be expected) rise above the market price. Instead, the
winning auction price should be bounded by the market
value, because the highest bidder would be able to obtain
the collateral at market prices elsewhere, and would have
no incentive to bid above the market price.
C. Two-person bidding example
We can apply our theory in a scenario with only two
bidders, α and β, participating in a Maker auction. We
assume there is no alternative-usage value of the collat-
eral to the bidders. Therefore, the only factors relevant to
the bidders are their participation costs. We also assume
that α’s and β’s participation costs are 2% and 3.5% of
the collateral value, respectively.
We assume that α and β will continue bidding the
price higher7 until the auction discount8 is equal one
of the bidder’s participation costs. β can only bid the
price up to 96.5% of the collateral value (a discount of
-3.5%), while α can bid up to 98% of the collateral value
(a discount of -2%). Therefore, α should always win in
an auction setting, because α can bid at a higher price
than β, without suffering a loss.
7In the first auction phase (tend), bidders increase the payment
amount. In the second auction phase (dent), bidders lower the reward
proceeds, which effectively raises the price of the collateral. For sim-
plicity, all bids will be referred to as raising the price, without reference
to whether the payment is being increased or the reward is being
decreased.
8If the bidding price is below the market price, the difference
between the two prices, divided by the market price is referred to as
a “discount” and is expressed as a negative percentage. If the bidding
price is above the market price, the difference between the two prices,
divided by the market price, is referred to as a “markup“ and is
expressed as a positive percentage.
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Fig. 2. Example auction with two bidders. Over the course of the 6-
hour auction, the discount is reduced until it reaches the participation
cost threshold of one of the bidders. At that point, the bidder with the
lower threshold (the lower participation cost) will win the auction.
D. Proposed bidding strategy
We first note that the value of alternative usage is a
key component in determining the appropriate bid price.
However, it is quite difficult to estimate the alternative-
usage value for collateral. For purposes of this analysis,
we focus primarily on participation costs, and only re-
turn to alternative-usage values at the end of this paper.
With that caveat established, we can then propose
an optimal bidding strategy. From the examples given
above, we arrive at the following proposals:
1) Participation costs determine bidding strategy.
2) The bidder with the lowest participation costs will
always win.
3) Participation costs can be optimized to the lowest
possible amount for each bid value.
Fig. 3. Theoretical minimum auction discount
By optimizing participation costs to their lowest pos-
sible total, a bidder could calculate the minimum partic-
ipation costs required at every bid value. Dividing these
costs into the market price yields a minimum auction
discount, expressed as a percentage (see Figure 3). The
minimum auction discount serves as a bidding thresh-
old, because a bid with a discount smaller than the
minimum auction discount (e.g. a higher price) would
be unprofitable. Therefore, a bidder should never bid at
a smaller discount than the minimum auction discount,
or (in equivalent terms) should never bid at a price
higher than the market price subtracted from participa-
tion costs.
V. Participation costs
Having established the importance of participation
costs in determining bid valuations, we now define the
specific costs incurred to participate in Maker auctions.
In order to determine the costs incurred, we created
a bot to run as a keeper on the Kovan test network.
The Kovan network is a test version of the Ethereum
network, and transactions executed on this network do
not carry any monetary value. However, the functionality
of the Kovan network closely mirrors the main Ethereum
network. In addition, the Maker Protocol has set up
identical smart contracts on both Kovan and the main
Ethereum network, which allows for testing under near-
real conditions on the Kovan network.
The keeper bot ran in May and June of 2020, and
participated in a total of 42 auctions on the Kovan
network. In addition to testing automated bidding, we
also manually executed certain transactions, such as
exchanging collateral rewards (WETH) for DAI, and vice-
versa (see full transaction history at [24]).
After analyzing the transactions required to run the
bot, we identified three types of participation costs:
1) Transaction fees: Gas fees to execute transactions on
the Ethereum blockchain.
2) Conversion costs: Slippage and trading fees for
converting currencies on decentralized exchanges.
3) Cost of capital: Implicit cost of holding capital in
cryptocurrencies.
The costs listed above could be calculated from on-
chain data, either directly (transaction fees and conver-
sion costs) or indirectly (cost of capital). Although cost of
capital is not directly incurred on the blockchain, its cost
is derived from the value of the currency held onchain,
and we therefore included the costs in our analysis. We
did not include costs that were not directly related to on-
chain transactions, such as the cost of hardware, electric-
ity, maintenance, and other equipment costs. While these
cost are incurred by keepers, we concluded that such
costs were out-of-scope of our analysis, which focuses
on the optimization of onchain costs.
In the following sections, we define the specific com-
ponents of participation costs.
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A. Transaction fees
In Ethereum, charges for computing power are mea-
sured in “gas” G. Each transaction on Ethereum takes up
a certain amount of gas. For example, a transfer between
two non-smart contract addresses always takes up 21,000
G [25]. A transaction involving smart contracts would
take up a greater amount of gas, with the exact value
determined by the complexity of transaction.
Miners then charge a fee for the use of Ethereum’s
computational power. This fee is called the “gas price”
µ. The gas price is generally quoted in “gwei”, which is
worth 10−9 of a full unit of ETH (“ether”). The conversion
factor between ether and gwei is represented throughout
as g  10−9.
The total transaction fee is calculated as the gas used
multiplied by the gas price, or Gµ. The resulting answer
is in gwei; to convert to ethers, the largest unit of
Ethereum, the answer can be calculated as Gµg.
1) Bid fees: For purposes of this exercise, we assumed
that bidders would not initiate (kick) an auction, and
that bids would only be submitted in the dent phase
(gas used Gdent).
If the auction is won, the rewards must be collected
(gas used Gdeal). Gdeal will only be incurred if the auction
is won. Therefore, we also incorporate the probability x
of winning the auction. The total fee, expressed in terms
of ETH, is
Fbid  (Gdent + Gdealx)µg (2)
2) Rebalance fees: In the Maker system, DAI must be
sent to a smart contract, called the Vat, before the DAI
can be submitted for a bid. If a bid is won, the reward
is received in WETH. Assuming auctions are won at a
steady rate, the available balance of DAI in the Vat will be
depleted over time, while the available balance of WETH
in the Vat will increase over time.
In order to ensure a sufficient amount of collateral is
available for bidding, the currency balance in the Vat
must be periodically rebalanced, by converting WETH
back to DAI. This operation cannot be performed inside
the Vat. Therefore, the following three transactions are
required, all of which require gas:
1) Removing WETH from the Vat (exit)
2) Converting WETH to DAI, using an exchange (trade)
3) Adding DAI back to the Vat (join)
The gas fees associated with these transactions are
defined as Gexit , Gtrade , and G join , respectively. The three
transactions described above do not need to be executed
after every bid. Rather, their frequency depends on how
quickly the Vat balance is depleted of the DAI needed
to submit future bids, as well as the frequency of bids
being successful.
It is assumed that a keeper will set a maximum
amount of bidding capital in the Vat (Vmax), and a min-
imum amount of capital (Vmin). The difference between
these two amounts is the “rebalance margin” R, or the
amount of capital that is to be depleted before the Vat is
rebalanced.
Assuming the first transaction by a keeper sets the Vat
capital at Vmax , all subsequent bids will take up a certain
percentage of R, before the capital needs to be rebalanced
at Vmin . Because the gas fees described above are only
incurred when capital reaches Vmin (that is, when R is
fully depleted), each bid can be ascribed a proportional
amount of gas fees, y, using the percentage the bid value
B is of R.
As an example, if Vmax is set at 10,000 DAI and Vmin
is set at 7,500 DAI, then R is 2,500. A B of 1,000 DAI will
represent 40% of R. If gas fees, calculated and converted
to DAI, are 0.2 DAI, then the gas fees ascribed to B are
0.08 DAI (40% x 0.2).
The proportional allocation does not, however, rise
above 100%. A B of 5,000 DAI would be 200% of an
R of 2,500. However, the rebalancing of the portfolio
from WETH back to DAI would be performed in a single
trade, not in multiple trades. Therefore, the proportional
allocation y would be calculated as 1 if B ≥ R, and BR
otherwise.
The allocated costs are further adjusted by the proba-
bility x of winning the auction. Total rebalance fees are
defined as
Frebal  (Gexit + Gtrade + G join)µgxy (3)
y 
{
1 if B ≥ R
B
R else
(4)
3) Total gas fees: The final step to calculating gas fees
is to convert the amount in ethers to an amount in DAI.
This conversion can be accomplished by multiplying by
the WETH/DAI exchange rate. The exchange rate can be
derived from the Uniswap reserves by calculating T0T1 (see
Section V-B for a detailed explanation of these values).
Ftotal  (Fbid + Frebal)T0T1
 (Gdent + Gdealx)µg T0T1
+ (Gexit + Gtrade + G join)µgxy T0T1
(5)
B. Conversion costs
As mentioned above, the account portfolio needs to be
periodically rebalanced between WETH and DAI. This
rebalance occurs by trading WETH for DAI on an ex-
change. To simplify our analysis, we assumed all trades
were executed on Uniswap, the largest DeFi exchange by
trading volume.9
Uniswap uses a “constant-product market-maker”
model, with “liquidity pools” set up as reserves for
9We note that Equations (6) through (11) are based primarily on
the introductory work on Uniswap’s mathematical characteristics by
Angeris et al. [11].
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currency pairs. Given reserve T0 for token 0, and reserve
T1 for token 1, the constant product k will always equal
T0T1, in the absence of trading fees.
Assuming that no trading fees are taken, the change
∆T0, caused by trading in an amount of T0 to the
liquidity pool, can be used to calculate the total change
in the liquidity pool. Given the constant product nature
of the liquidity pool, the new value of k will be
k  (T1 − ∆T1)(T0 + ∆T0) (6)
Rearranging the terms of Equation (6), the output
amount of T1 in a trade will be
∆T1  T1 − kT0 + ∆T0 (7)
When trading fees are introduced to the liquidity
pool, k now increases in proportion with trading fees
γ, while still holding constant if fees are omitted from
the equation.
k  (T1 − ∆T1)(T0 + (1 − γ)∆T0) (8)
Rearranging the terms of Equation (8), the output
amount of T1 in a trade will be
∆T1  T1 − kT0 + (1 − γ)∆T0 (9)
The implicit price in the liquidity pool before a trade,
P0, is given as P0  T1T0 . The implicit price for the trade
itself, P1, would be ∆T1∆T0 . Slippage S is defined as the loss
in value executed after the trade, and can be calculated
as P0−P1P0 . In expanded form, S is calculated as
S 
T1
T0 −
T1− T0T1T0+(1−γ)∆T0
∆T0
T1
T0
(10)
After factoring the terms, S may be expressed as
S 
γT0 + (1 − γ)∆T0
T0 + (1 − γ)∆T0 (11)
In the context of Maker auctions, ∆T0 would normally
be the amount of WETH exchanged for DAI. However,
∆T0 is dependent on the values of B and R, both of
which are expressed in terms of DAI. Therefore, we
express ∆T0 as an amount of DAI, with reserve T0 being
the reserve for DAI. This conversion means that we are
solving for slippage on the conversion of DAI to WETH,
and not WETH to DAI, as would be the case in reality.
However, the nature of constant-product markets is such
that the slippage calculation results in the same answer,
regardless of which currency is used as the input token.
If B ≥ R, then an amount of WETH, equal in value
to B, would need to be exchanged for DAI. Slippage
would be calculated with ∆T0 equal to B (in DAI), and
the full slippage amount would be included in the cost
calculation. If B < R, however, WETH would not need to
be rebalanced until R was fully depleted over multiple
auctions. Therefore, when B < R, slippage would be
calculated with ∆T0 equal to the R (in DAI), and the
resulting amount allocated to the cost calculation by
multiplying by BR .
The conditional aspects of this calculation are repre-
sented by variables y (allocation of costs up to 100%) and
z (the value to use in the calculation, expressed in terms
of DAI). y is defined in Equation (4), and z is defined as
z 
{
B if B ≥ R
R else
(12)
The amount of slippage is also adjusted by the prob-
ability x of winning the auction (if the auction is not
won, then no WETH will need to be exchanged). Finally,
the slippage amount, which is in percentage form, is
multiplied by B, so that slippage costs are expressed in
terms of DAI. In expanded form, S can be calculated as
S 
γT0 + (1 − γ)z
T0 + (1 − γ)z xyB (13)
C. Cost of capital
The amount of DAI capital held in the Vat is allowed
to fluctuate between Vmax and Vmin . However, the total
portfolio value does not change, as any DAI used to pay
for a bid is replaced by WETH of roughly the same value.
Therefore, we assume that Vmax represents the average
balance held throughout the year. Vmax is then subject
to a capital charge r (also known as the “required rate
of return”). The annual cost of capital is defined as
Kannual  rVmax (14)
Kannual can then be allocated to an individual bid,
assuming a certain number of bids in a year, Byear .
Allocating equally to individual bids inherently assumes
a constant rate of depletion throughout the year, includ-
ing auctions won or lost. Because of this assumption,
we do not need to explicitly include an adjustment for
probability x of winning an auction.
In expanded form, the cost of capital ascribed to an
individual bid would be
Kbid 
rVmax
Byear
(15)
D. Total participation costs
Total participation costs are defined as
C  Ftotal + S + Kbid (16)
We measure C relative to B, as CB . Over smaller values
of B, C deceases as a percentage of B, because of the fixed
and semi-fixed nature of Kbid and Ftotal , respectively. At
higher values of B, however, C increases as a percentage
of B, because of the increasing costs of S.
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VI. Optimization
A. Optimization and constraints
In Equation (16), the two terms controllable by a
bidder are Vmax (maximum portfolio value) and R (re-
balance margin). We undertook to solve for the lowest
possible participation costs, using auction-specific data,
by adjusting the values for Vmax and R.
We selected an appropriate time period to analyze (see
further details in Section VI-B), during which 155 auc-
tions were completed in the Maker system. We selected
the final winning bid for each auction and then ran our
optimization 155 times, with parameters derived from
the winning bid for each auction. We then compared the
theoretical minimum auction discount, as recommended
by our optimization, to the actual discounts in our
historical data (see Section VI-C).
The optimization was bounded by several constraints,
in order to mirror real conditions:
• The minimum value of the portfolio (Vmax−R) must
be enough to cover the assumed bid value B. This
constraint also ensures that Vmax is greater than R,
which is necessary because R is subtracted from
Vmax , and the resulting value cannot be negative.
• The maximum portfolio value and rebalance margin
cannot be negative (infeasible), and the maximum
portfolio value cannot be zero (this would signify
non-participation).
The optimization is shown below in its full form.
min
Vmax ,R
(Gdent + Gdealx)µg T0T1
+ (Gexit + Gtrade + G join)µgxy T0T1
+
γT0 + (1 − γ)z
T0 + (1 − γ)z xyB
+
rVmax
Byear
y 
{
1 if B ≥ R
B
R else
z 
{
B if B ≥ R
R else
s.t. Vmax − R ≥ B
Vmax > 0
R ≥ 0
(17)
The objective function has two branches, depending
on the relation of B and R. Considered independently,
the functions resulting from the two branches are both
convex. As we desired to know the values of R and Vmax
that minimize the cost for a given value of B, we found
the optimal of the two branches separately and then
chose the R and Vmax corresponding to the minimum
cost of the two as the answer. The implementation was
completed in MATLAB.
B. Parameters and data collection
The full list of parameters used in our optimization is
included below. Further explanation of these parameters
is given in the following sections.
TABLE I
Optimization parameters
Auction-specific
Param Value Definition Source
B Variable Value of winning auction bid (1)
µ Variable Gas price at time of bid (1)
T0 Variable DAI reserve for ETH-DAI Uniswap pair (2)
T1 Variable ETH reserve for ETH-DAI Uniswap pair (2)
Transaction fees
Param Value Definition Source
Gdent 116,914 Gas used to submit dent transaction (1)
Gdeal 44,154 Gas used to submit deal transaction (1)
Gexit 80,145 Gas used to submit exit transaction [26]
Gtrade 125,700 Gas used to submit trade transaction [27]
G join 80,380 Gas used to submit join transaction [26]
g 10−9 Conversion from gwei to ethers (3)
γ 0.003 Uniswap trading fee for analysis period [28]
Cost of capital
Param Value Definition Source
Byear 365 Number of bids per year (1)
r 40% Cost of capital for cryptocurrency (4)
Other
Param Value Definition Source
x 15% Win probability for individual bid (1)
(1) Maker auction data
(2) Uniswap trading data
(3) Ethereum specifications
(4) Previous valuations
TABLE II
Optimization variables
Objectives
Param Value Definition
Vmax Variable Maximum value of portfolio
R Variable Amount of depletion in Vmax before rebalancing
1) Auction-specific data: We began by downloading all
Maker auction events (kick, tend, dent, and deal) from
the relevant Maker smart contract on the Ethereum
blockchain [29]. All data was downloaded through an
Infura node, which we queried using NodeJS running
on an Ubuntu 18.04 virtual machine.
We downloaded the auction events from the beginning
of the Maker liquidation process (November 13, 2019)
through the date that the Maker auction process was
upgraded to use new smart contracts (July 28, 2020). Our
analysis focused specifically on the period of March 23,
2020 through July 28, 2020. The beginning date of March
23 was chosen in order to exclude outliers, such as the
zero-value bids of March 12, 2020, and a handful of bids
that were submitted at prices many times higher than
the prevailing market price (likely in error). The end date
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of July 28, 2020 was chosen so that the auction process
would be consistent across all auctions analyzed.
We also downloaded information on the Uniswap
reserves for the ETH-DAI trading pair from Uniswap’s
GraphQL node [30] (for version 1 of the Uniswap proto-
col), and from the Uniswap smart contract for the ETH-
DAI trading pair on the Ethereum blockchain [31] (for
version 2 of the protocol).
From this data set, we were able to derive the auction-
specific parameters, which changed from auction to auc-
tion based on the auction settings or the conditions of
the Ethereum network.
We note that Uniswap upgraded their protocol from
version 1 to version 2 on May 19, 2020. Since the upgrade,
both version 1 and version 2 have had active ETH-DAI
trading pairs, albeit with the majority of the volume
shifting to version 2 over time. In our optimization, we
set T0 and T1 equal to the reserves of whichever pair had
the larger reserves. In practice, this condition meant that
the trading pair for version 1 was used through June
25, 2020, and the trading pair for version 2 was used
thereafter.
2) Transaction fees: Because of the complex calcula-
tions required to estimate the gas usage for transactions
involving smart contracts, we used historical data to
estimate the typical gas used for each Maker transaction
type (dent, deal, exit, and join), as well as for Uniswap
transactions (trade). For each event type, we selected
the most recent 50 transactions (except for exit and join,
which were downloaded as one set of 50 transactions),
either from our database of auction events or from the
transaction history publicly available on Etherscan. This
data was downloaded between June 20 and June 22, 2020.
We found that gas usage was higher for multi-step
transactions, in which multiple events were executed in
a single transaction. We assumed that bidders would ex-
ecute transactions step-by-step; therefore, we considered
only transactions with a single event being executed.
Within the group of single-event transactions, we chose
the gas usage with the most frequent occurrence in the
data. If multiple values had the highest occurrence, we
chose the highest amount of gas usage.
We note that the average cost for trading tokens varied
depending on the number of tokens involved; some
trades could involve trading from Currency A to B (two
tokens), or Currency A to Currency B to Currency C
(three tokens), and so on. In our analysis, we collected
data from trades using up to four tokens, and then used
a regression model to estimate the gas fees used for trad-
ing. When t tokens were involved in a trade, the gas used
for trading (Gtrade ) was estimated at (47, 912t) + 29, 876.
For simplicity, two tokens were assumed to be involved
in each trade, which led to a value of 125,700 for Gtrade .
3) Cost of capital: The allocation of the cost of capital
depends on the number of bids made in the year (Byear).
In the selected data set, 155 auctions were completed
over the period of 128 days (March 23 through July 28),
a rate of approximately 1.2 auctions per day. We rounded
this number to 1 bid per day, resulting in a value of 365
for Byear .
The allocated cost also depends on the cost of capital
percentage r, also known as the discount rate. Because of
the uncertain nature of their future utility, cryptocurren-
cies are generally valued using very high discount rates.
While no single number can be defined as the appropri-
ate discount rate, we observed that most valuations used
discount rates between 30% at the low end [32] and 50%
at the high end [33]. From this range, we chose the mid-
point value of 40%, a rate which has itself been used in
several prior valuations [34], [35]. A discount rate of 40%
also falls within the range of returns expected for startup
companies that are growing but still unprofitable [36], a
description applicable to many cryptocurrency projects.
We note that the valuations referenced above assume
cryptocurrencies have highly volatile prices when com-
pared to the US dollar. To our knowledge, formal re-
search has not examined the valuation of stablecoins,
such as the DAI currency that we assume is being held
in a bidder’s portfolio. Stablecoins are designed to be
pegged to the US dollar, and in theory could use a dis-
count rate that approaches the risk-free rate. In practice,
however, stablecoins have many riskful characteristics
that would increase their risk premium above the risk-
free rate. Defining a stablecoin-specific discount rate is
outside the scope of this paper, and for purposes of this
analysis, we align our discount rate with those used by
prior cryptocurrency valuations.
4) Other: We calculated win probability x by aggre-
gating all bids associated to the auctions included in our
analysis (two auctions were initiated on March 22, but
concluded on March 23, which resulted in our history
extending back to March 22). We then calculated the
total number of bids (1,011). Dividing the total number
of winning bids by the total number of bids resulted in
a value of approximately 15% for x.
C. Optimization results
After optimizing the participation costs in 155 auc-
tions, we compared our optimal bidding price to the
actual auction-winning bid prices.
TABLE III
Auction sample characteristics
Bid value Count %
$1 - $1,000 114 74
$1,001 - $10,000 18 12
> $10,000 23 15
All 155 100
We first observed that the actual bidding price was
higher than the optimal bidding price in 75% of the
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TABLE IV
Optimization results
Bid value Actual > Optimal Actual < Optimal
Count % Count %
$1 - $1,000 95 83 19 17
$1,001 - $10,000 10 56 8 44
> $10,000 12 52 11 48
All 117 75 38 25
auctions. While this condition was true for over 80% of
auctions with a winning bid value equal to or less than
$1,000, it was true for only slightly more than half of
auctions with a bid value greater than $1,000.
Fig. 4. Comparison of optimal markup or discount vs. actual markup
or discount, for all bids up to $1,000
Fig. 5. Comparison of optimal markup or discount vs. actual markup
or discount, for all bids over $1,000
It may be theorized that individual bidders did not
include cost of capital in their calculations, because the
cost is implicit only. If participation costs only included
explicit costs (transaction fees and conversion costs), then
the resulting minimum auction discount may be closer to
the actual auction discount. Therefore, we modified the
calculation of total participation costs to exclude cost of
capital, with results shown in Table V.
TABLE V
Optimization results, with cost of capital excluded
Bid value Actual > Optimal Actual < Optimal
Count % Count %
$1 - $1,000 93 82 21 18
$1,001 - $10,000 10 56 8 44
> $10,000 12 52 11 48
All 115 74 40 26
This modification changed the results of only two auc-
tions, leaving the majority of bids still at a price higher
than optimal, with most above-optimal bids occurring in
auctions with bid values of $1 to $1,000.
D. Discussion
From the results of the analysis above, it is evident that
the majority of auction-winning bids were at prices that
would not allow bidders to recoup their participation
costs. Our discussion of this seemingly unprofitable
behavior begins by considering two potential reasons,
which are ultimately rejected as feasible explanations.
We then describe three reasons that may serve as
probable explanations for this behavior.
Reasons not accepted
1) Infeasibility of optimal portfolio to individual bidders:
We acknowledge that it would be infeasible for bidders
to adjust their portfolio size to be optimal at every value
of B. The bid value of each new auction cannot be known
in advance; in addition, multiple auctions with different
values can be triggered at the same time. In hindsight, we
were able to calculate what would have been the optimal
portfolio size; in practice, however, it is impossible to
adjust the value of Vmax and R to arrive at the optimal
cost for every new auction. Therefore, bidders would
need to adjust their portfolio values to be optimal for
just one value of B.
However, even if an individual bidder is unable to
arrive at the optimal price for every auction, the totality
of bidders participating in an auction should reach a
near-optimal price for each auction. For example, Bidder
A may be optimized for a B of $10,000, Bidder B for a
B of $5,000, Bidder C for a B of $1,000, and so on. With
multiple bidders optimized for a range of B values, each
auction should have a winning price that approaches
the optimal price for that auction. Therefore, we do not
believe that the infeasibility of an optimal portfolio for
an individual bidder explains the gap in optimal versus
actual prices.
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2) Use of auctions as a trading mechanism: It may
be conjectured that bidders are not interested in
making profits, but rather in exchanging DAI for WETH
cheaply, which can be accomplished through the auction
process. However, the Maker auction process requires
multiple transactions and a wait of up to several hours
before auction collateral can be collected. In contrast,
decentralized exchanges allow DAI and WETH to be
traded nearly instantaneously in a single transaction. As
a result, we believe it is unlikely that individuals would
use the Maker auction process, in its current form, as a
trading mechanism.
Proposed reasons
1) Indifference to cost of capital: The cost of capital is
an implicit cost that does not appear on a transaction
record or a wallet balance. Therefore, some bidders may
disregard this cost when drawing up their bidding strat-
egy. This condition may be particularly true for bidders
who hold cryptocurrency based on personal preference
(such as to avoid using money in the traditional financial
system), rather than as a financial investment. For these
bidders, the theoretical required return for cryptocur-
rencies may be of little consequence in their day-to-day
decision-making.
2) Inexperienced actors: Although some bidders may be
indifferent to cost of capital, no bidder should be indiffer-
ent to explicit onchain costs, such as transaction fees and
conversion costs. However, as shown in Table V, three-
fourths of bids submitted did not cover transactions fees
and conversion costs. These results indicate certain bid-
ders may not be aware of the full costs that are required
to participate in Maker auctions. Although running an
automated keeper bot requires a high degree of technical
sophistication, we cannot dismiss the possibility that
some bidders may devise their bidding strategy without
a comprehensive accounting of the requisite costs.
3) Altruistic actors: Indifference to cost of capital or
lack of experience may explain why certain bids do
not cover all participation costs; these theories do not
explain why bids which are submitted at above-market
prices. Any bidders that submit bids at prices higher
than the market price are guaranteed to experience a
loss on their portfolio value, even before subtracting
participation costs.
Although these bids may not be rational from a fi-
nancial standpoint, they indicate the presence of other
non-financial motivations. Certain bidders may be mo-
tivated to strengthen the Maker ecosystem as a whole
and prevent disruptive events, such as the zero-value
bids of March 12, 2020. These bidders can therefore
lose money on a single bid, but still profit through the
smooth running of the system overall. Returning to our
conceptual “jar of coins” model, certain bidders may
have an alternative value a for the collateral, which is
the guarantee that a smooth auction process secures the
stability of the system overall. These bidders can bid
above the market price, because their total profit of a
(alternative-usage) −(b + c + d) (participation costs) is
positive. The value of a is a private-value component
for each bidder, in what is otherwise a common-value
auction (as discussed in Appendix A).
The identities of these altruistic bidders are unknown
in the anonymous setting of the Ethereum blockchain.
However, these bidders could include any individual
or organization with an incentive to ensure the Maker
system runs smoothly.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed an optimal bidding
strategy for Maker auctions, based on minimizing the
costs of participation. When comparing the proposed
optimal bidding price to historical data, we find that the
majority of auctions were won at prices higher than the
optimal bidding price.
We can suggest three avenues through which this
research can be further extended. First, the optimal
bidding price may be modified by including additional
factors that influence bidding behavior. Potential factors
to consider include the time at which the bid is placed in
the auction lifecycle, the number of bidders participating,
and external conditions on the Ethereum blockchain.
Second, our paper focused on prices above the optimal
price, and did not explore in detail why a quarter of
auctions finished at prices below the optimal price. Fur-
ther research may uncover why certain auctions finish at
prices that allow for bidder profits, while many others
do not.
Finally, the theoretical model will require modifica-
tions under the newly proposed Maker auction system.
This system has not been formally specified, but a pre-
liminary proposal outlines the use of a Dutch auction
system, in which bid prices start high and gradually
decrease over time [37]. This change would allow bids
to be won in a single transaction, which opens the
possibility of using “flash loans” to bid on auctions with-
out pre-existing capital. The new auction system will
undoubtedly change the optimal strategy for bidders,
and will provide a fresh area of research once the new
process has been fully implemented.
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Appendix
A. Formal characteristics of Maker auctions
The following section defines the characteristics of
Maker auctions, within the framework of formal auction
theory.
Ascending: Maker auctions are categorized as as-
cending, or English, auctions, in that the price of the
reward (the collateral) starts low and continues to rise
throughout the auction process [38, p. 11]. The auctions
do not, however, follow the process of Japanese auctions
(a variant of English auctions), in which the auctioneer
raises the price until all bidders drop out [39, p. 187].
In the case of Maker auctions, individuals must submit
their own bids to raise the price, and they are allowed
to make “jump bids”, which are bids that significantly
increase the price above the minimum bid increments
[38, p. 11].
Second-price: Maker auctions are equivalent to
second-price auctions; if all bidders bid up to their
reservation price (the highest price they are willing to
pay), the winning bidder pays an amount equal to the
reservation price of the second-highest bidder, adjusted
for the minimum bid increment [39, p. 10]. Maker auc-
tions are not Vickrey auctions, however, as bids are not
sealed. Therefore, bidders can learn about other bidders’
behaviors, ex post, by reviewing transaction data on the
Ethereum blockchain (a method we use ourselves in
Section VI).
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The information to be gleaned about other bidders has
two limitations. First, the only public information about
each bidder is their address on the Ethereum blockchain.
A bidder could easily use multiple addresses, which
means that any analysis of bidding history by address
would be unable to capture, with certainty, the full
behavior of individual bidders. Second, the auctions do
not have a formal drop-out mechanism, whereby bidders
can formally signal they have ceased bidding. Bidders
are able to submit a bid at any point in the auction, and
they do not need to signal their entrance or withdrawal
from an auction. Therefore, without knowing when other
bidders have dropped out of a specific auction, a bidder
is unable to collect information on the relative valuations
of other bidders while an auction is ongoing.
Single-unit: Maker auctions are single-unit, as each
auction sells a specified collateral amount, and each
bidder must bid for the entirety of the collateral, without
any adjustments to quantity [40]. There can be multiple
single-unit auctions that run simultaneously, depending
on the depth of liquidation volume.
Interdependent-value: Maker auctions have a
common-value component to them, albeit with a
departure from the conventional definition of common-
value auctions. In the traditional model of common-
value auctions, the item being auctioned has a single
true value, but bidders do not know the true value ex
ante [41, p. 2]. In Maker auctions, the collateral being
auctioned has a true value, but bidders actually do
know the true value of the collateral. For example, the
value of ETH is defined by its price in US dollars. Each
bidder has access to public information on the price of
ETH, and would therefore know the true value of the
collateral.
Maker auctions also have a private-value component,
because of the participation costs required for bidders.
These costs (which are defined in greater detail in
Section V) must be incurred in order to participate in
the auctions process, and therefore lower each bidder’s
valuation. The costs can be optimized, but the estimates
required to formulate an optimization are such that each
bidder will likely have a different optimization curve
(see Section VI for further detail). Prior research has
confirmed that bidders will adjust their bids to account
for participation costs such as entrance fees or bid prepa-
ration costs [42], [43]. The exact nature of the bid adjust-
ment is theorized in the literature, but these theories do
not translate specifically to Maker auctions. Participation
costs in Maker auctions contain several nuances that are
not accounted for in general models, such as transaction
fees dependent on frequency of rebalancing, as well as
the concept of slippage when exchanging currencies.
An additional private-value component comes from
the potential usage of the collateral. For example, by
virtue of superior knowledge or resources, a bidder may
anticipate gaining additional profits after obtaining ETH,
in excess of what an average bidder would expect to
make. These private values are difficult to quantify, but
are discussed as potential factors in auction valuations
in Section VI.
In summary, Maker auctions have both common-value
and private-value components. As a result, we categorize
these auctions as interdependent-value auctions.
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